Tuesday, December 30, 2014
Greece In Turmoil After Third Failed Presidential Vote Means January 25 Snap Elections | Zero Hedge
Greece In Turmoil After Third Failed Presidential Vote Means January 25 Snap Elections | Zero Hedge
This means that the "worst case" scenario - at least as described by Goldman - is now on deck: a snap general election that could bring the anti-bailout Syriza party to power.
Greek Bond Yields Over 12% At Post-Bailout High | EconMatters
Greek Bond Yields Over 12% At Post-Bailout High | EconMatters
In general, it is clear that there are concerns around SYRIZA’s ability to govern and what exactly they will do when in power. They have said they will renegotiate the Greek bailout and push for a debt restructuring, however, it is far from clear what they will do if they do not get what they want or how hard they will push back against other eurozone countries unwillingness to take such action. Much of the market uncertainty – Greek borrowing costs have risen and the stock market has fallen sharply – can be attributed to markets trying to price this political uncertainty.
Monday, December 29, 2014
Roger Farmer : "The Greek dance with debt"
Roger Farmer's Economic Window: The Greek dance with debt: If you thought that the Greek debt crisis was over; think again. Tomorrow, the Greek parliament will try, for the third time, to agree on w...
One hour ago Parliament decided to have an election by Feb. 1st
Most likely scenario (60% probability):
Disclaimer: I am about to lose something like 50% of the purchasing power of my pension on top of the 45% I have lost since 2010
"Euro zone rattled as Greece braces for elections" : Reuters
"Greece's Presidential Vote Just Failed And Markets Are Crashing" : Business Insider
One hour ago Parliament decided to have an election by Feb. 1st
Most likely scenario (60% probability):
- SYRIZA tops the polls without a Parliamentary majority.
- Only potential, anti-MOU, coalition partner, right-wing ANEL party, does not enter Parliament by some 0.3 percentage points.
- Only possible coalition partner(s) are the conservative ND of incumbent PM, PASOK, or POTAMI.
- None of these three can, or will, stomach the programme of SYRIZA.
- The left wing inside SYRIZA will not stomach any compromise on the campaign programme.
- New elections are anounced for sometime late Feb or beginning March
- The bailout programme expires on Feb 28
- Rating agencies downgrade Greek debt and ECB cannot accept it as collateral. ELA is the only mechanism for financing Greek banks and the Athens bourse tanks; as I write, it is down 10%.
- Armageddon for the Greek economy.
- Brussells, Berlin, and Frankfurt "shrug shoulders" and carry on "business as usual".
- EURO is saved(!!!) at a bearable cost.
Disclaimer: I am about to lose something like 50% of the purchasing power of my pension on top of the 45% I have lost since 2010
"Euro zone rattled as Greece braces for elections" : Reuters
"Greece's Presidential Vote Just Failed And Markets Are Crashing" : Business Insider
Saturday, December 20, 2014
Friday, December 19, 2014
How does my country grow? Lessons for the EZ | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal
How does my country grow? Lessons for the EZ | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal
The Canuto, Pinto, and Prasad paper
Structural reform is particularly costly in the context of a debt overhang and an overvalued exchange rate. However, the crux is not debt restructuring per se, but whether economic governance changes credibly for the better following it.
The Canuto, Pinto, and Prasad paper
How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?
AEAweb: JEP (28,4) p. 77 - How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?
the discussion has also identified a set of concrete policies that can go some way towards explaining the Scandinavian puzzle, namely the use of far-reaching information trails that facilitate tax compliance, broad tax bases that limit the scope of legal tax avoidance, and large public spending focused on complements to work.
Thursday, December 18, 2014
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Friday, December 12, 2014
Edward Hugh : "It’s Baaack: Looming Greek Elections Threaten To Re-ignite the Euro Crisis"
It’s Baaack: Looming Greek Elections Threaten To Re-ignite the Euro Crisis | A Fistful Of Euros
Mr Tsipras will be banking on the idea that the EU leaders will back down, and talk turkey. But what if they don’t? Their room for manoeuvre on this front is far more limited than it is on the debt one, since others in the south would surely want to follow a similar path if they thought they could. Grexit may be something that no one actually wants to happen, but sometimes things no one wants to happen do.
Thursday, December 11, 2014
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Friday, December 5, 2014
When Will the ECB Move on Monetary Stimulus?
RealTime Economic Issues Watch | When Will the ECB Move on Monetary Stimulus?
"An Added Uncertainty: Greece, Spain, and Portugal
"An Added Uncertainty: Greece, Spain, and Portugal
Another confrontation looms between the Greek government and the rest of the euro area next year. Because the government in Athens seems increasingly unlikely to muster enough votes to elect a new president to succeed Karolos Papoulias, early elections are possible.4 Syriza—the main leftist opposition party seeking to end large parts of the country’s current reform program, lower Greece’s primary surpluses, stop privatization programs, and reverse some structural reforms—is leading in the polls. Should it win power in new elections, the euro area will likely refuse most of its political demands, setting the stage for a mini-repeat of the summer of 2012, where the euro area relied on market mayhem to convince Greek voters to vote for a responsible government. Whether or not such a hardball electoral tactic works again, it will complicate decision making for the ECB on sovereign bond purchases. The ECB would hardly want to purchase any Greek government bonds in a period of conflict over Greece. The ECB lacks the option of buying a GDP-weighted basket of all euro area members, and it would not want to determine which countries’ bonds would be eligible, politicizing its own role in a most unwelcome way."
Thursday, December 4, 2014
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
Antonio Fatas : The logic behind the German Euro gamble.
Antonio Fatas on the Global Economy: The logic behind the German Euro gamble.: In the current economic policy debate in Europe there seems to be an increasing polarization between the German view and the view of the oth...
Greece's Great Depression, charted
Coppola Comment: Greece's Great Depression, charted: Via the FT's Robin Wigglesworth comes this chart: Greek RGDP fell by 28% between 2008 and the end of 2013. Since then it has increa...
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
The German Euro is Undervalued
Middle Class Political Economist: Basics: The German Euro is Undervalued: I keep telling people that the German euro is undervalued, but some folks seem not to believe me. (See the comments section from this post ...
Monday, December 1, 2014
Sunday, November 30, 2014
Simon Wren-Lewis : "Can a country be too competitive?"
mainly macro: Can a country be too competitive?: In my earlier post on the failure of the Eurozone to understand the lessons of the Great Depression, I talked about Germany becoming ‘too ...
also, Francesco Saraceno : "Labour Costs: Who is the Outlier?"
also, Francesco Saraceno : "Labour Costs: Who is the Outlier?"
Paul Krugman : "Being Bad Europeans" - NYTimes.com
Being Bad Europeans - NYTimes.com
If you try to identify countries whose policies were way out of line before the crisis, have hurt Europe since the crisis, and refuse to learn from experience, everything points to Germany as the worst actor. ...via Mark Thoma
Friday, November 28, 2014
Wednesday, November 26, 2014
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Monday, November 24, 2014
Daniel Gros : Investment as the key to recovery in the euro area? | The Centre for European Policy Studies
Investment as the key to recovery in the euro area? | The Centre for European Policy Studies
"The author advises that the aim of economic policy should be to increase consumption, rather than investment overall. Increasing infrastructure investment might be justified in some member countries, but it is not a ‘free lunch’ when efficiency levels are low, which seems to be the case in some of the financially stressed euro area countries."
"The author advises that the aim of economic policy should be to increase consumption, rather than investment overall. Increasing infrastructure investment might be justified in some member countries, but it is not a ‘free lunch’ when efficiency levels are low, which seems to be the case in some of the financially stressed euro area countries."
Saturday, November 22, 2014
Does Management Matter In Schools?
CEP | Publications | Results by Abstract
Nicholas Bloom, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, John Van Reenen
Nicholas Bloom, Renata Lemos, Raffaella Sadun, John Van Reenen
Give Greece a Chance - Bloomberg View
Give Greece a Chance - Bloomberg View
"If too much austerity puts Syriza in charge, expect an end to fiscal discipline. The damage, though, won't stop there. The entire European project will be endangered. Tsipras might be willing to force losses on creditors unilaterally. Rising opposition parties in Portugal and Spain are similarly inclined, and they are watching closely. If markets begin to fear a wave of defaults, the resulting turmoil could thrust the whole of Europe back into crisis."
Friday, November 21, 2014
The Utopian · The Thirteen Commandments of Neoliberalism
The Utopian · The Thirteen Commandments of Neoliberalism
" It is very important to have some familiarity with neoliberal ideas, if only to resist simple-minded characterizations"
Thursday, November 20, 2014
Wednesday, November 19, 2014
Tuesday, November 18, 2014
Barry Eichengreen at the FT : The bond market’s dance over European debt will not last forever - FT.com
The bond market’s dance over European debt will not last forever - FT.com
The implied surpluses are mind-boggling. Under reasonable assumptions about growth rates and interest rates, the average annual primary surplus for the decade ending in 2030 would exceed 4 per cent for Spain, 5 per cent for Ireland, Italy and Portugal, and 7 per cent for Greece. Put simply, no country can run such monumental surpluses for such extended periods without inciting a taxpayer revolt.....
But sadly growth cannot be conjured up out of thin air.
European policy makers have shown an inability to conjure it up any other way.The other alternative is debt restructuring. European officials continue to dance around the idea of writing down public debt, promising Greece lower interest rates and longer maturities but denying the need for more fundamental restructuring and for applying such measures more widely. The events of recent weeks make clear that they will not be able to dance much longer.
America’s bank bailouts worked - The Washington Post
America’s bank bailouts worked - The Washington Post
The United States actually got the big details of the bailout right – and for this reason, American taxpayers made money on the deal: about $8-10 billion, excluding the non-bank parts of the bailout.The United Kingdom and Germany, by way of contrast, both enacted bailouts that were less effective in helping taxpayers share in the potential upside of the bailout. As a result, U.K. and German taxpayers were stuck with large book losses on their bailouts: $14 billion for the United Kingdom, and $55 billion for Germany, which is a lot of money, even for German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Κώστας Λαπαβίτσας και "διαβουκόλευση" στοιχείων της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ
τα στοιχεία δείχνουν ότι στις αρχές του 2010 η ελληνική οικονομία φαινόταν να περνάει σε ανάκαμψη ...
Δηλαδή; Αν το 2010 συνέχιζε να υπάρχει δυνατότητα δανεισμού, όλα θα ήταν μια χαρά. Κάτι δεν πάει καλά όμως!
Ο κ. Κ.Λ. πήρε στοιχεία της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ και "κατασκεύασε" τον Πίνακα 2 στην ανάρτησή του, που πράγματι δείχνει αυτό που ισχυρίζεται!
Μόνο που ο Πίνακας 2 λέει ψέματα. (είναι σχετικά εύκολο να πεις ψέματα αν ξέρεις Στατιστική).
Τα ανεπεξέργαστα στοιχεία της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ για το ΑΕΠ (% αλλαγή 3-μήνου) είναι
2008: Q1 +7,0 % 2009: Q1 -4,7% 2010: Q1 -1,7 %
Q2 -0,8 Q2 +2,6 Q2 -2,7
Q3 -0,6 Q3 -0,4 Q3 -3,4
Q4 -1,1 Q4 -0,1 Q4 -1,5
Από την "άφιξη" της κρίσης - 2008 Q2- μέχρι και σήμερα, τα μόνα 3-μηνα με θετικό πρόσημο είναι το Β΄του 2009 και τα Α' (0.8%) και Β' (0,3%) του 2014.
Πού την είδε ο κ. Κ.Λ. την ανάκαμψη στις αρχές του 2010 ?!?!?!
Δηλαδή; Αν το 2010 συνέχιζε να υπάρχει δυνατότητα δανεισμού, όλα θα ήταν μια χαρά. Κάτι δεν πάει καλά όμως!
Ο κ. Κ.Λ. πήρε στοιχεία της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ και "κατασκεύασε" τον Πίνακα 2 στην ανάρτησή του, που πράγματι δείχνει αυτό που ισχυρίζεται!
Μόνο που ο Πίνακας 2 λέει ψέματα. (είναι σχετικά εύκολο να πεις ψέματα αν ξέρεις Στατιστική).
Τα ανεπεξέργαστα στοιχεία της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ για το ΑΕΠ (% αλλαγή 3-μήνου) είναι
2008: Q1 +7,0 % 2009: Q1 -4,7% 2010: Q1 -1,7 %
Q2 -0,8 Q2 +2,6 Q2 -2,7
Q3 -0,6 Q3 -0,4 Q3 -3,4
Q4 -1,1 Q4 -0,1 Q4 -1,5
Από την "άφιξη" της κρίσης - 2008 Q2- μέχρι και σήμερα, τα μόνα 3-μηνα με θετικό πρόσημο είναι το Β΄του 2009 και τα Α' (0.8%) και Β' (0,3%) του 2014.
Πού την είδε ο κ. Κ.Λ. την ανάκαμψη στις αρχές του 2010 ?!?!?!
Monday, November 17, 2014
Albert Weale, Policy Network - The democratic disconnect
Policy Network - The democratic disconnect
In the eurozone, the EU needs greater legitimacy at the national level not only to secure space for domestic politics but also to secure respect for social and economic commitments over time
In the eurozone, the EU needs greater legitimacy at the national level not only to secure space for domestic politics but also to secure respect for social and economic commitments over time
Saturday, November 15, 2014
Greece lightening | The Economist
Daily chart: Greece lightening | The Economist
Matt O'Brien at WP: Greece’s recession is over, but its depression will be the worst in history
Exiting recession is an important moment, but only the first step in Greece's recovery.
Matt O'Brien at WP: Greece’s recession is over, but its depression will be the worst in history
Friday, November 14, 2014
Peter Dorman: Rules versus Discretion in Macropolicy
EconoSpeak: Rules versus Discretion in Macropolicy: Economists really like policy rules. Remember the monetarist bubble of the late 70s? Just follow a rule for steady expansion of M2, and le...
Thursday, November 13, 2014
Συριζα καί Επιχειρηματικά (κόκκινα) Δάνεια
Σήμερα ο βουλευτής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ Κοντονής, ή κάπως έτσι, ρωτήθηκε γιά τα ληξιπρόθεσμα επιχειρηματικά δάνεια. Εξήγησε, με όλη την σιγουριά του αδαούς, οτι η αρνητική θέση του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ οφείλεται στο ότι "το καρτέλ των τραπεζών είναι σε κομβικό σημείο" να αποφασίζει γι αυτά!
Προφανώς ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ προορίζει τον κ.Κοντονή για να αποφασίζει και να κρίνει ποιές επιχειρήσεις θα κλείσουν και ποιές θα (ανα)-χρηματοδοτηθούν. Και καλλά, ο κ. Κοντονής πλέει σε πελάγη άγνοιας, το οικονομικό επιτελείο του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ δέν χαμπαρίζει απο τραπεζική λειτουργία; Σίγουρα ξέρει, αλλά προφανώς δέν απευθύνεται σε πολίτες που ξέρουν και βάζει ταλαίπωρους Κοντονήδες να λένε χαζομάρες.
disclaimer (ερμηνευτική ρήτρα)
Τούτο το blog ΔΕΝ είναι για σχολιασμό, αλλά δέν...άντεξα!
Προφανώς ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ προορίζει τον κ.Κοντονή για να αποφασίζει και να κρίνει ποιές επιχειρήσεις θα κλείσουν και ποιές θα (ανα)-χρηματοδοτηθούν. Και καλλά, ο κ. Κοντονής πλέει σε πελάγη άγνοιας, το οικονομικό επιτελείο του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ δέν χαμπαρίζει απο τραπεζική λειτουργία; Σίγουρα ξέρει, αλλά προφανώς δέν απευθύνεται σε πολίτες που ξέρουν και βάζει ταλαίπωρους Κοντονήδες να λένε χαζομάρες.
disclaimer (ερμηνευτική ρήτρα)
Τούτο το blog ΔΕΝ είναι για σχολιασμό, αλλά δέν...άντεξα!
Timothy Taylor : Why Experts Buy Generic
Οι ειδικοί καί οι ¨πληροφορημένοι" αγοράζουν γενόσημα!
CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST: Why Experts Buy Generic
CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST: Why Experts Buy Generic
Wednesday, November 12, 2014
Tuesday, November 11, 2014
mainly macro: Getting the Germany argument right
mainly macro: Getting the Germany argument right: As the Eurozone experiences a prolonged demand-deficient recession, and given Germany’s pivotal role in making that happen, it is important...
Michael Miebach 's column for Policy Network : "There is no 'German problem' in the Eurozone"
Michael Miebach 's column for Policy Network : "There is no 'German problem' in the Eurozone"
Paul De Grauwe : "Greece: The start of a systemic crisis of the Eurozone?" | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal
Greece: The start of a systemic crisis of the Eurozone? | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal
Things are different in some individual countries, in Greece in particular, a country with a weak political system that has been adding government debt at a much higher rate than the rest of the Eurozone and that in addition has a debt level exceeding 100% of GDP. So, while the Eurozone as a whole is no closer to a debt crisis than is the US, some of its member states have been moving closer to such a crisis.This column, first published 15 December 2009, shows ...
Monday, November 10, 2014
Sunday, November 9, 2014
Saturday, November 8, 2014
Thursday, November 6, 2014
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
Paul Hockenos | Germany's Polite Populists | Foreign Affairs | Foreign Affairs
Paul Hockenos | Germany's Polite Populists | Foreign Affairs | Foreign Affairs
"Although few Germans openly identify as right wing, many people across the political spectrum harbor illiberal political beliefs."
Tuesday, November 4, 2014
Greece : EU Commission Forcasts , Autumn 2014
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2014_autumn/el_en.pdf
Uncertainty a major risk
Greece’s GDP growth could turn out weaker than forecast if uncertainty on policy implementation has a stronger-than-projected effect on confidence
and investment, or if geopolitical events have a bigger-than-expected impact in the region. On the upside, exports may exceed expectations and investors’ confidence could pick up owing, in particular to the successful processing of nonperforming loans and to the positive results of the Asset Quality Review and stress tests. Overall, the balance of risks points to the downside since uncertainty is significant for the next few months.
Uncertainty a major risk
Greece’s GDP growth could turn out weaker than forecast if uncertainty on policy implementation has a stronger-than-projected effect on confidence
and investment, or if geopolitical events have a bigger-than-expected impact in the region. On the upside, exports may exceed expectations and investors’ confidence could pick up owing, in particular to the successful processing of nonperforming loans and to the positive results of the Asset Quality Review and stress tests. Overall, the balance of risks points to the downside since uncertainty is significant for the next few months.
Douglas Elliott : Three Potential Economic Outcomes for Europe | RealClearMarkets
Three Potential Economic Outcomes for Europe | RealClearMarkets
- It was just a glitch (20% probability?)
- The Euro Crisis is Back (probability 10%?)
- The Usual Muddling Through (70% probability?)
Sunday, November 2, 2014
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.
Δημόσιοι Υπάλληλοι Έβγαλαν στο Εξωτερικό 1,5 δις.
Το θέμα της
περασμένης βδομάδας. WOW, ανατριχίλα!
Συνέχεια όμως μαθαίνουμε ότι, κατά κύριο λόγο, πρόκειται για
γιατρούς και εκπαιδευτικούς, που τυχαίνει να είναι/ήταν και Δημόσιοι Υπάλληλοι.
Πού και ποια η έκπληξη;
Το
2012 δημοσιεύτηκε έρευνα (στο αρχείο μου και εδώ pdf) για το φαινόμενο στην Ελλάδα, της οποίας ένα
συμπέρασμα ήταν ότι ο πρώτος και ο τρίτος από τους κορυφαίους κλάδους στην
απόκρυψη φορολογητέας ύλης ήταν Γιατροί, και Εκπαιδευτικοί. Η πλειοψηφία αυτών απασχολούνται
στο δημόσιο.
Η
κυβέρνηση, για δικούς της λόγους, επέλεξε να παίξει ένα επικοινωνιακό παιχνίδι.
Τα ΜΜΕ το μεγέθυναν.
Friday, October 31, 2014
Thursday, October 30, 2014
Europe: Building a Banking Union | Stratfor
Europe: Building a Banking Union | Stratfor
"The recent stress tests by the European Central Bank offered few surprises and did not cause any significant political or financial reactions in the Continent. However, these tests were only the beginning of a complex process to build a banking union in the European Union. Unlike the stress tests, the next steps in this project could create more divisions in Europe because national parliaments will be involved at a time when Euroskepticism is on the rise."
"The recent stress tests by the European Central Bank offered few surprises and did not cause any significant political or financial reactions in the Continent. However, these tests were only the beginning of a complex process to build a banking union in the European Union. Unlike the stress tests, the next steps in this project could create more divisions in Europe because national parliaments will be involved at a time when Euroskepticism is on the rise."
Wednesday, October 29, 2014
Frances Coppola at Pieria : "European Stress Tests: not stressful enough"
How right I was looking forward to her take
European Stress Tests: not stressful enough
"In my view the ECB has done a good job with the AQR. It has standardised methodologies across the European banking system: it has forced banks to end systematic over-valuation of certain types of asset, notably commercial loans and property: and it has exposed serious weaknesses in risk pricing and management, notably in counterparty credit risk where 50% of banks need to improve their methodologies."
...
"But I am much less impressed with the stress tests. The EBA has madeexactly the same mistake that it made in previous tests: it has ignored the real risks facing the EU."
...
"The European banking system is still infested with zombies, which can pass stress tests but can't lend. Until these are killed off or significantly restructured, there can be no great improvement in lending."
European Stress Tests: not stressful enough
"In my view the ECB has done a good job with the AQR. It has standardised methodologies across the European banking system: it has forced banks to end systematic over-valuation of certain types of asset, notably commercial loans and property: and it has exposed serious weaknesses in risk pricing and management, notably in counterparty credit risk where 50% of banks need to improve their methodologies."
...
"But I am much less impressed with the stress tests. The EBA has madeexactly the same mistake that it made in previous tests: it has ignored the real risks facing the EU."
...
"The European banking system is still infested with zombies, which can pass stress tests but can't lend. Until these are killed off or significantly restructured, there can be no great improvement in lending."
Tuesday, October 28, 2014
The Importance of Being Europe — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
The Importance of Being Europe — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
Two of the papers mentioned:
Enrico Spolaone : What Is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists
"Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this "political guide for economists," we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established? What is European integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas in a sort of chain reaction toward an "ever-closer union." The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.
L.Guiso, P.Sapienza, L.Zingales for Brookings : "Monnet’s Error?"
"Do partial steps toward European integration generate support for further steps or do they create a political backlash? We try to answer this question by analyzing the cross sectional and time series variation in pro-European sentiment in the EU 15 countries. The two major steps forward (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 enlargement) seem to have reduced the pro-Europe sentiment as does the 2010 Eurozone crisis. Yet, in spite of the worst recession in recent history,
the Europeans still support the common currency. Europe seems trapped in catch-22: there is no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, but it is economically unsustainable to stay
still.
Two of the papers mentioned:
Enrico Spolaone : What Is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists
"Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this "political guide for economists," we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established? What is European integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas in a sort of chain reaction toward an "ever-closer union." The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.
L.Guiso, P.Sapienza, L.Zingales for Brookings : "Monnet’s Error?"
"Do partial steps toward European integration generate support for further steps or do they create a political backlash? We try to answer this question by analyzing the cross sectional and time series variation in pro-European sentiment in the EU 15 countries. The two major steps forward (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 enlargement) seem to have reduced the pro-Europe sentiment as does the 2010 Eurozone crisis. Yet, in spite of the worst recession in recent history,
the Europeans still support the common currency. Europe seems trapped in catch-22: there is no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, but it is economically unsustainable to stay
still.
Sunday, October 26, 2014
Simon Wren-Lewis : Why the Eurozone suffers from a Germany problem
mainly macro: Why the Eurozone suffers from a Germany problem: When, almost a year ago, Paul Krugman wrote six posts within three days laying into the stance of Germany on the Eurozone’s macroeconomic p...
EBA publishes 2014 EU-wide stress test results - View press release - European Banking Authority
EBA publishes 2014 EU-wide stress test results - View press release - European Banking Authority
Bloomberg and Reuters
Waiting for Frances Coppola 's take on the subject, check again on her post Financial hurricanes
Here is Tyler Durden 's at ZeroHedge
Gavyn Davies at FT asks: "Two crucial questions remain. Has enough at last been done to fix the European banking system? And will this on its own be enough to ward off the threat of deflation that is hanging over the eurozone?"
While Dan McCrum at FT Alphaville "On the broader outlook, remember that at heart it is all about lending, and whether banks will now do more of it. Not likely, says Alberto (Gallo from RBS).
Christian Schulz, Senior Economist of Berenberg
"A period of stress and uncertainty ends for Eurozone banks with the end of the exercise. We expect banks to refocus their resources on running their business, which should gradually improve credit availability where it was impaired. The
growth impact on the Eurozone next year will be small (we estimate 0.1-0.2% of GDP), but in the periphery, where credit availability has been restricted, the impact could be larger. The ECB is providing generous funding if banks want to increase new lending."
Bloomberg and Reuters
Waiting for Frances Coppola 's take on the subject, check again on her post Financial hurricanes
Here is Tyler Durden 's at ZeroHedge
Gavyn Davies at FT asks: "Two crucial questions remain. Has enough at last been done to fix the European banking system? And will this on its own be enough to ward off the threat of deflation that is hanging over the eurozone?"
While Dan McCrum at FT Alphaville "On the broader outlook, remember that at heart it is all about lending, and whether banks will now do more of it. Not likely, says Alberto (Gallo from RBS).
What does this mean for lending? 80% of banks may have passed the test, and two-thirds comfortably so, but even so they may still not be ready to expand lending. As we discussed in last week’s Revolver, banks remain reluctant to lend because of low leverage ratios, low quality of capital and weak demand for credit.
Christian Schulz, Senior Economist of Berenberg
"A period of stress and uncertainty ends for Eurozone banks with the end of the exercise. We expect banks to refocus their resources on running their business, which should gradually improve credit availability where it was impaired. The
growth impact on the Eurozone next year will be small (we estimate 0.1-0.2% of GDP), but in the periphery, where credit availability has been restricted, the impact could be larger. The ECB is providing generous funding if banks want to increase new lending."
Saturday, October 25, 2014
H ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ, και The Economist
Η -έντυπη-
ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, 25Οκτ. αναδημοσιεύει στήλη από την έντυπη έκδοση του ECONOMIST «Έωλα τα σχέδια εξόδου της Ελλάδας από το Μνημόνιο» . Ο τίτλος του Economist, είναι: Not so fast: a spike in bond yields is bad news for the government (ΣΣ. καλή μετάφραση).
Η ηλεκτρονική έκδοση του ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ, 24 Οκτ. 10:34, με τίτλο Economist: Ο Τσίπρας οικοδομεί γέφυρες με ΕΕ και Βερολίνο: «Κρατά καθησυχαστική στάση απέναντι στους δυνητικούς επενδυτές , δημοσιεύει εκτενή
αποσπάσματα -σχεδόν όλο το κομμάτι του Economist.
Μέχρις εδώ, όλα καλά! Αλλά, υπάρχει μία κοινή παράληψη και
στα δύο μέσα.
Απέκοψαν την τελευταία φράση της καταληκτικής παραγράφου.
The hedge funds that led the recent stampede out of Greek bonds have yet to be entirely convinced.
Γιατί άραγε; Μήπως αυτή η φράση αναιρεί το κύριο «συμπέρασμα» των;
Σχόλιο αναγνώστη στο ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ: «σίγουρα? | 24/10/2014 13:27
Εισατε σιγουροι οτι γραφει αυτο
που μας λετε το αρθρο...? Μηπως δεν γνωριζετε αγγλικα?»
Friday, October 24, 2014
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
David Einhorn at Business Insider : Long Greece, Short France" !
There were two main reasons why Greece got clobbered, both were political. First, the market got uneasy about the rising popularity of Syriza, an anti-austerity radical political party. Second, the country's Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, said he wanted to end the Greek bailout early without taking over $8 billion more dollars available.
....
He ends: "To change all of this, France would have to implement serious reform. Greece, on the other hand, needs to stay the bailout course to stabilize, at least relatively."
....
He ends: "To change all of this, France would have to implement serious reform. Greece, on the other hand, needs to stay the bailout course to stabilize, at least relatively."
Clive Crook at Bloomberg QuickTake : "Secular Stagnation
All the refs on the topic included
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/secular-stagnation-economy
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/secular-stagnation-economy
Tuesday, October 21, 2014
Expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills - European Commission
Expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills - European Commission: Expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills - European Commission
Sovereign-debt relief and its aftermath: The 1930s, the 1990s, the future? | vox
Carmen M Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch
Sovereign-debt relief and its aftermath: The 1930s, the 1990s, the future? | vox
Sovereign-debt relief and its aftermath: The 1930s, the 1990s, the future? | vox
Monday, October 20, 2014
Markets right to worry about euro zone | Hugo Dixon
Markets right to worry about euro zone | Hugo Dixon
""As if this were not enough, the euro zone continues to inflict wounds on itself. The latest was Greece’s rush to exit its bailout programme. The bond markets reacted by pushing up Greek bond yields last week to such a level that Athens’ ability to stand on its own two feet is off the agenda for the foreseeable future.
""As if this were not enough, the euro zone continues to inflict wounds on itself. The latest was Greece’s rush to exit its bailout programme. The bond markets reacted by pushing up Greek bond yields last week to such a level that Athens’ ability to stand on its own two feet is off the agenda for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, a snap election may be held in Greece early next year. That would probably be won by the radical left Syriza party, which wants to write off half the government’s debts. This could cause contagion in Italy, whose debts are an eye-popping 137 percent of GDP."""
Τί λέει ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ?
Πώς θα σχολίαζε ο Ezra Klein? How politics makes us stupid...
Wolfgang Streeck: How Will Capitalism End?
New Left Review - Wolfgang Streeck: How Will Capitalism End?
W.S. concludes
""In summary, capitalism, as a social order held together by a promise of boundless collective progress, is in critical condition. Growth is giving way to secular stagnation; what economic progress remains is less and less shared; and confidence in the capitalist money economy is leveraged on a rising mountain of promises that are ever less likely to be kept. Since the 1970s, the capitalist centre has undergone three successive crises, of inflation, public finances and private debt. Today, in an uneasy phase of transition, its survival depends on central banks providing it with unlimited synthetic liquidity. Step by step, capitalism’s shotgun marriage with democracy since 1945 is breaking up. On the three frontiers of commodification—labour, nature and money—regulatory institutions restraining the advance of capitalism for its own good have collapsed, and after the final victory of capitalism over its enemies no political agency capable of rebuilding them is in sight. The capitalist system is at present stricken with at least five worsening disorders for which no cure is at hand: declining growth, oligarchy, starvation of the public sphere, corruption and international anarchy. What is to be expected, on the basis of capitalism’s recent historical record, is a long and painful period of cumulative decay: of intensifying frictions, of fragility and uncertainty, and of a steady succession of ‘normal accidents’—not necessarily but quite possibly on the scale of the global breakdown of the 1930s.""
W.S. concludes
""In summary, capitalism, as a social order held together by a promise of boundless collective progress, is in critical condition. Growth is giving way to secular stagnation; what economic progress remains is less and less shared; and confidence in the capitalist money economy is leveraged on a rising mountain of promises that are ever less likely to be kept. Since the 1970s, the capitalist centre has undergone three successive crises, of inflation, public finances and private debt. Today, in an uneasy phase of transition, its survival depends on central banks providing it with unlimited synthetic liquidity. Step by step, capitalism’s shotgun marriage with democracy since 1945 is breaking up. On the three frontiers of commodification—labour, nature and money—regulatory institutions restraining the advance of capitalism for its own good have collapsed, and after the final victory of capitalism over its enemies no political agency capable of rebuilding them is in sight. The capitalist system is at present stricken with at least five worsening disorders for which no cure is at hand: declining growth, oligarchy, starvation of the public sphere, corruption and international anarchy. What is to be expected, on the basis of capitalism’s recent historical record, is a long and painful period of cumulative decay: of intensifying frictions, of fragility and uncertainty, and of a steady succession of ‘normal accidents’—not necessarily but quite possibly on the scale of the global breakdown of the 1930s.""
Sunday, October 19, 2014
ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΗΣ ΠΛΑΤΦΟΡΜΑΣ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
Απο το iskra.gr
ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΗΣ ΠΛΑΤΦΟΡΜΑΣ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
Και το ρεπορτάζ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΘΗΚΑΝ ΟΙ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΕ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?
ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΗΣ ΠΛΑΤΦΟΡΜΑΣ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
Και το ρεπορτάζ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΘΗΚΑΝ ΟΙ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΕ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?
Friday, October 17, 2014
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Tuesday, October 14, 2014
Edward Hugh : "Don't Shoot the Messenger » Eurocrisis Round Two, Blame the Germans Edition"
Great post by Edward Hugh
EconoMonitor : Don't Shoot the Messenger » Eurocrisis Round Two, Blame the Germans Edition
He quotes Paul Krugman: " “Draghi can try to get traction through quantitative easing, but it’s by no means clear that this could do the trick even under the best of circumstances — and in reality he faces severe political constraints on what he can do.” -
... and inserts the below pic.... great!
EconoMonitor : Don't Shoot the Messenger » Eurocrisis Round Two, Blame the Germans Edition
What southern Europe needs is a revolution in the mindset and more “better quality” stuff, and no amount of blaming Germany for the situation can get over that. The extractive networks who hold back growth need reforming out of existence. (emphasis added)
He quotes Paul Krugman: " “Draghi can try to get traction through quantitative easing, but it’s by no means clear that this could do the trick even under the best of circumstances — and in reality he faces severe political constraints on what he can do.” -
... and inserts the below pic.... great!
Monday, October 13, 2014
Italy has no good Plan B | Hugo Dixon
Italy has no good Plan B | Hugo Dixon
Matteo Renzi’s Plan A is to push through domestic reforms, hope the European Central Bank manages to get inflation ticking up, and keep his fingers crossed the Italian economy stops shrinking. But if this fails, a mega wealth tax, debt restructuring and/or exit from the euro beckons.
Sunday, October 12, 2014
Thursday, October 9, 2014
Ν. Χουντής: «Στόχος μας η διαγραφή του μεγαλύτερου μέρους του χρέους με ρήτρα αποπληρωμής και ανάπτυξης»
Ν. Χουντής: «Στόχος μας η διαγραφή του μεγαλύτερου μέρους του χρέους με ρήτρα αποπληρωμής και ανάπτυξης»
Ο Ν.Χ. είναι υπεύθυνος της επιτροπής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ για τη διαπραγμάτευση του χρέους,
Τρείς άξωνες
1. Να δούμε ποιό πραγματικά το ύψος μετά απο Διεθνή Λογιστικό Έλεγχο.... απαλείφοντας, διαγράφοντας, αποσύροντας το επαχθές μέρος
2. Να δούμε σε ποιό βαθμό φταίει η ΕΕ, που αν και γνώριζε, μας άφησε να φτάσουμε εκεί που φτάσαμε, και να μας ¨αποζημειώσει¨
3. Μετά τα <1> και <2> να δούμε άν και σε ποιό βαθμό αυτό που μένει το αντέχει η οικονομία
Ο Ν.Χ. είναι υπεύθυνος της επιτροπής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ για τη διαπραγμάτευση του χρέους,
Τρείς άξωνες
1. Να δούμε ποιό πραγματικά το ύψος μετά απο Διεθνή Λογιστικό Έλεγχο.... απαλείφοντας, διαγράφοντας, αποσύροντας το επαχθές μέρος
2. Να δούμε σε ποιό βαθμό φταίει η ΕΕ, που αν και γνώριζε, μας άφησε να φτάσουμε εκεί που φτάσαμε, και να μας ¨αποζημειώσει¨
3. Μετά τα <1> και <2> να δούμε άν και σε ποιό βαθμό αυτό που μένει το αντέχει η οικονομία
Wednesday, October 8, 2014
IMF FISCAL MONITOR October 2014
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2014/02/pdf/fm1402.pdf
left.gr 'Χρηματοδοτικό κενό 27 δισ. ευρώ για το 2015-2016"
Απο τους πίνακες
left.gr 'Χρηματοδοτικό κενό 27 δισ. ευρώ για το 2015-2016"
Απο τους πίνακες
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015 2016
2017
General Government Overall Balance (Percent of GDP)
–6.2 –6.8 –9.9 –15.6 –11.0 –9.6 –6.4
–3.2 –2.7 –1.9 –0.6
–0.7
General
Government Primary Balance (Percent of GDP)
–1.6 –2.0 –4.8 –10.5 –5.1 –2.4 –1.3
0.8 1.5 3.0
4.5 4.5
General
Government Cyclically Adjusted Balance (Percent of potential GDP)
–8.7 –10.8 –14.3 –19.1 –12.3 –8.3 –2.3
1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.4
General
Government Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (Percent of potential GDP)
–3.7 –5.6 –8.6 –13.6 –6.2 –1.3 2.3 5.1 5.4 5.7 6.1 5.5
General
Government Revenue (Percent of GDP)
39.2 40.7 40.7 38.3 40.4 42.2 43.8 44.0 44.6 43.2 42.4 42.2
General
Government Expenditure (Percent of GDP)
45.4 47.5 50.6 54.0 51.4 51.9 50.2 47.2 47.3 45.1 43.0 42.9
General
Government Gross Debt (Percent of GDP)
107.5 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 157.2 175.1 174.2 171.0 160.5 152.0
General
Government Net Debt (Percent of GDP)
107.5 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 153.5 169.7 168.8 166.6 157.6 149.6
Tuesday, October 7, 2014
"Monday, October 6, 2014
Saturday, October 4, 2014
Friday, October 3, 2014
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