Youth aged 15 to 24 not in education, employment or training – league table 41countries | Real-World Economics Review Blog
Grim reading....
Friday, October 31, 2014
Thursday, October 30, 2014
Europe: Building a Banking Union | Stratfor
Europe: Building a Banking Union | Stratfor
"The recent stress tests by the European Central Bank offered few surprises and did not cause any significant political or financial reactions in the Continent. However, these tests were only the beginning of a complex process to build a banking union in the European Union. Unlike the stress tests, the next steps in this project could create more divisions in Europe because national parliaments will be involved at a time when Euroskepticism is on the rise."
"The recent stress tests by the European Central Bank offered few surprises and did not cause any significant political or financial reactions in the Continent. However, these tests were only the beginning of a complex process to build a banking union in the European Union. Unlike the stress tests, the next steps in this project could create more divisions in Europe because national parliaments will be involved at a time when Euroskepticism is on the rise."
Wednesday, October 29, 2014
Frances Coppola at Pieria : "European Stress Tests: not stressful enough"
How right I was looking forward to her take
European Stress Tests: not stressful enough
"In my view the ECB has done a good job with the AQR. It has standardised methodologies across the European banking system: it has forced banks to end systematic over-valuation of certain types of asset, notably commercial loans and property: and it has exposed serious weaknesses in risk pricing and management, notably in counterparty credit risk where 50% of banks need to improve their methodologies."
...
"But I am much less impressed with the stress tests. The EBA has madeexactly the same mistake that it made in previous tests: it has ignored the real risks facing the EU."
...
"The European banking system is still infested with zombies, which can pass stress tests but can't lend. Until these are killed off or significantly restructured, there can be no great improvement in lending."
European Stress Tests: not stressful enough
"In my view the ECB has done a good job with the AQR. It has standardised methodologies across the European banking system: it has forced banks to end systematic over-valuation of certain types of asset, notably commercial loans and property: and it has exposed serious weaknesses in risk pricing and management, notably in counterparty credit risk where 50% of banks need to improve their methodologies."
...
"But I am much less impressed with the stress tests. The EBA has madeexactly the same mistake that it made in previous tests: it has ignored the real risks facing the EU."
...
"The European banking system is still infested with zombies, which can pass stress tests but can't lend. Until these are killed off or significantly restructured, there can be no great improvement in lending."
Tuesday, October 28, 2014
The Importance of Being Europe — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
The Importance of Being Europe — Money, Banking and Financial Markets
Two of the papers mentioned:
Enrico Spolaone : What Is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists
"Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this "political guide for economists," we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established? What is European integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas in a sort of chain reaction toward an "ever-closer union." The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.
L.Guiso, P.Sapienza, L.Zingales for Brookings : "Monnet’s Error?"
"Do partial steps toward European integration generate support for further steps or do they create a political backlash? We try to answer this question by analyzing the cross sectional and time series variation in pro-European sentiment in the EU 15 countries. The two major steps forward (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 enlargement) seem to have reduced the pro-Europe sentiment as does the 2010 Eurozone crisis. Yet, in spite of the worst recession in recent history,
the Europeans still support the common currency. Europe seems trapped in catch-22: there is no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, but it is economically unsustainable to stay
still.
Two of the papers mentioned:
Enrico Spolaone : What Is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists
"Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this "political guide for economists," we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established? What is European integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas in a sort of chain reaction toward an "ever-closer union." The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.
L.Guiso, P.Sapienza, L.Zingales for Brookings : "Monnet’s Error?"
"Do partial steps toward European integration generate support for further steps or do they create a political backlash? We try to answer this question by analyzing the cross sectional and time series variation in pro-European sentiment in the EU 15 countries. The two major steps forward (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2004 enlargement) seem to have reduced the pro-Europe sentiment as does the 2010 Eurozone crisis. Yet, in spite of the worst recession in recent history,
the Europeans still support the common currency. Europe seems trapped in catch-22: there is no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, but it is economically unsustainable to stay
still.
Sunday, October 26, 2014
Simon Wren-Lewis : Why the Eurozone suffers from a Germany problem
mainly macro: Why the Eurozone suffers from a Germany problem: When, almost a year ago, Paul Krugman wrote six posts within three days laying into the stance of Germany on the Eurozone’s macroeconomic p...
EBA publishes 2014 EU-wide stress test results - View press release - European Banking Authority
EBA publishes 2014 EU-wide stress test results - View press release - European Banking Authority
Bloomberg and Reuters
Waiting for Frances Coppola 's take on the subject, check again on her post Financial hurricanes
Here is Tyler Durden 's at ZeroHedge
Gavyn Davies at FT asks: "Two crucial questions remain. Has enough at last been done to fix the European banking system? And will this on its own be enough to ward off the threat of deflation that is hanging over the eurozone?"
While Dan McCrum at FT Alphaville "On the broader outlook, remember that at heart it is all about lending, and whether banks will now do more of it. Not likely, says Alberto (Gallo from RBS).
Christian Schulz, Senior Economist of Berenberg
"A period of stress and uncertainty ends for Eurozone banks with the end of the exercise. We expect banks to refocus their resources on running their business, which should gradually improve credit availability where it was impaired. The
growth impact on the Eurozone next year will be small (we estimate 0.1-0.2% of GDP), but in the periphery, where credit availability has been restricted, the impact could be larger. The ECB is providing generous funding if banks want to increase new lending."
Bloomberg and Reuters
Waiting for Frances Coppola 's take on the subject, check again on her post Financial hurricanes
Here is Tyler Durden 's at ZeroHedge
Gavyn Davies at FT asks: "Two crucial questions remain. Has enough at last been done to fix the European banking system? And will this on its own be enough to ward off the threat of deflation that is hanging over the eurozone?"
While Dan McCrum at FT Alphaville "On the broader outlook, remember that at heart it is all about lending, and whether banks will now do more of it. Not likely, says Alberto (Gallo from RBS).
What does this mean for lending? 80% of banks may have passed the test, and two-thirds comfortably so, but even so they may still not be ready to expand lending. As we discussed in last week’s Revolver, banks remain reluctant to lend because of low leverage ratios, low quality of capital and weak demand for credit.
Christian Schulz, Senior Economist of Berenberg
"A period of stress and uncertainty ends for Eurozone banks with the end of the exercise. We expect banks to refocus their resources on running their business, which should gradually improve credit availability where it was impaired. The
growth impact on the Eurozone next year will be small (we estimate 0.1-0.2% of GDP), but in the periphery, where credit availability has been restricted, the impact could be larger. The ECB is providing generous funding if banks want to increase new lending."
Saturday, October 25, 2014
H ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ, και The Economist
Η -έντυπη-
ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, 25Οκτ. αναδημοσιεύει στήλη από την έντυπη έκδοση του ECONOMIST «Έωλα τα σχέδια εξόδου της Ελλάδας από το Μνημόνιο» . Ο τίτλος του Economist, είναι: Not so fast: a spike in bond yields is bad news for the government (ΣΣ. καλή μετάφραση).
Η ηλεκτρονική έκδοση του ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ, 24 Οκτ. 10:34, με τίτλο Economist: Ο Τσίπρας οικοδομεί γέφυρες με ΕΕ και Βερολίνο: «Κρατά καθησυχαστική στάση απέναντι στους δυνητικούς επενδυτές , δημοσιεύει εκτενή
αποσπάσματα -σχεδόν όλο το κομμάτι του Economist.
Μέχρις εδώ, όλα καλά! Αλλά, υπάρχει μία κοινή παράληψη και
στα δύο μέσα.
Απέκοψαν την τελευταία φράση της καταληκτικής παραγράφου.
The hedge funds that led the recent stampede out of Greek bonds have yet to be entirely convinced.
Γιατί άραγε; Μήπως αυτή η φράση αναιρεί το κύριο «συμπέρασμα» των;
Σχόλιο αναγνώστη στο ΤΟ ΒΗΜΑ: «σίγουρα? | 24/10/2014 13:27
Εισατε σιγουροι οτι γραφει αυτο
που μας λετε το αρθρο...? Μηπως δεν γνωριζετε αγγλικα?»
Friday, October 24, 2014
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
David Einhorn at Business Insider : Long Greece, Short France" !
There were two main reasons why Greece got clobbered, both were political. First, the market got uneasy about the rising popularity of Syriza, an anti-austerity radical political party. Second, the country's Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, said he wanted to end the Greek bailout early without taking over $8 billion more dollars available.
....
He ends: "To change all of this, France would have to implement serious reform. Greece, on the other hand, needs to stay the bailout course to stabilize, at least relatively."
....
He ends: "To change all of this, France would have to implement serious reform. Greece, on the other hand, needs to stay the bailout course to stabilize, at least relatively."
Clive Crook at Bloomberg QuickTake : "Secular Stagnation
All the refs on the topic included
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/secular-stagnation-economy
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/secular-stagnation-economy
Tuesday, October 21, 2014
Expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills - European Commission
Expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills - European Commission: Expert group on a debt redemption fund and eurobills - European Commission
Sovereign-debt relief and its aftermath: The 1930s, the 1990s, the future? | vox
Carmen M Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch
Sovereign-debt relief and its aftermath: The 1930s, the 1990s, the future? | vox
Sovereign-debt relief and its aftermath: The 1930s, the 1990s, the future? | vox
Monday, October 20, 2014
Markets right to worry about euro zone | Hugo Dixon
Markets right to worry about euro zone | Hugo Dixon
""As if this were not enough, the euro zone continues to inflict wounds on itself. The latest was Greece’s rush to exit its bailout programme. The bond markets reacted by pushing up Greek bond yields last week to such a level that Athens’ ability to stand on its own two feet is off the agenda for the foreseeable future.
""As if this were not enough, the euro zone continues to inflict wounds on itself. The latest was Greece’s rush to exit its bailout programme. The bond markets reacted by pushing up Greek bond yields last week to such a level that Athens’ ability to stand on its own two feet is off the agenda for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, a snap election may be held in Greece early next year. That would probably be won by the radical left Syriza party, which wants to write off half the government’s debts. This could cause contagion in Italy, whose debts are an eye-popping 137 percent of GDP."""
Τί λέει ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ?
Πώς θα σχολίαζε ο Ezra Klein? How politics makes us stupid...
Wolfgang Streeck: How Will Capitalism End?
New Left Review - Wolfgang Streeck: How Will Capitalism End?
W.S. concludes
""In summary, capitalism, as a social order held together by a promise of boundless collective progress, is in critical condition. Growth is giving way to secular stagnation; what economic progress remains is less and less shared; and confidence in the capitalist money economy is leveraged on a rising mountain of promises that are ever less likely to be kept. Since the 1970s, the capitalist centre has undergone three successive crises, of inflation, public finances and private debt. Today, in an uneasy phase of transition, its survival depends on central banks providing it with unlimited synthetic liquidity. Step by step, capitalism’s shotgun marriage with democracy since 1945 is breaking up. On the three frontiers of commodification—labour, nature and money—regulatory institutions restraining the advance of capitalism for its own good have collapsed, and after the final victory of capitalism over its enemies no political agency capable of rebuilding them is in sight. The capitalist system is at present stricken with at least five worsening disorders for which no cure is at hand: declining growth, oligarchy, starvation of the public sphere, corruption and international anarchy. What is to be expected, on the basis of capitalism’s recent historical record, is a long and painful period of cumulative decay: of intensifying frictions, of fragility and uncertainty, and of a steady succession of ‘normal accidents’—not necessarily but quite possibly on the scale of the global breakdown of the 1930s.""
W.S. concludes
""In summary, capitalism, as a social order held together by a promise of boundless collective progress, is in critical condition. Growth is giving way to secular stagnation; what economic progress remains is less and less shared; and confidence in the capitalist money economy is leveraged on a rising mountain of promises that are ever less likely to be kept. Since the 1970s, the capitalist centre has undergone three successive crises, of inflation, public finances and private debt. Today, in an uneasy phase of transition, its survival depends on central banks providing it with unlimited synthetic liquidity. Step by step, capitalism’s shotgun marriage with democracy since 1945 is breaking up. On the three frontiers of commodification—labour, nature and money—regulatory institutions restraining the advance of capitalism for its own good have collapsed, and after the final victory of capitalism over its enemies no political agency capable of rebuilding them is in sight. The capitalist system is at present stricken with at least five worsening disorders for which no cure is at hand: declining growth, oligarchy, starvation of the public sphere, corruption and international anarchy. What is to be expected, on the basis of capitalism’s recent historical record, is a long and painful period of cumulative decay: of intensifying frictions, of fragility and uncertainty, and of a steady succession of ‘normal accidents’—not necessarily but quite possibly on the scale of the global breakdown of the 1930s.""
Sunday, October 19, 2014
ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΗΣ ΠΛΑΤΦΟΡΜΑΣ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
Απο το iskra.gr
ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΗΣ ΠΛΑΤΦΟΡΜΑΣ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
Και το ρεπορτάζ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΘΗΚΑΝ ΟΙ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΕ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?
ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΗΣ ΠΛΑΤΦΟΡΜΑΣ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
Και το ρεπορτάζ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΘΗΚΑΝ ΟΙ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΕ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΡΙΖΑ
?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?
Friday, October 17, 2014
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Tuesday, October 14, 2014
Edward Hugh : "Don't Shoot the Messenger » Eurocrisis Round Two, Blame the Germans Edition"
Great post by Edward Hugh
EconoMonitor : Don't Shoot the Messenger » Eurocrisis Round Two, Blame the Germans Edition
He quotes Paul Krugman: " “Draghi can try to get traction through quantitative easing, but it’s by no means clear that this could do the trick even under the best of circumstances — and in reality he faces severe political constraints on what he can do.” -
... and inserts the below pic.... great!
EconoMonitor : Don't Shoot the Messenger » Eurocrisis Round Two, Blame the Germans Edition
What southern Europe needs is a revolution in the mindset and more “better quality” stuff, and no amount of blaming Germany for the situation can get over that. The extractive networks who hold back growth need reforming out of existence. (emphasis added)
He quotes Paul Krugman: " “Draghi can try to get traction through quantitative easing, but it’s by no means clear that this could do the trick even under the best of circumstances — and in reality he faces severe political constraints on what he can do.” -
... and inserts the below pic.... great!
Monday, October 13, 2014
Italy has no good Plan B | Hugo Dixon
Italy has no good Plan B | Hugo Dixon
Matteo Renzi’s Plan A is to push through domestic reforms, hope the European Central Bank manages to get inflation ticking up, and keep his fingers crossed the Italian economy stops shrinking. But if this fails, a mega wealth tax, debt restructuring and/or exit from the euro beckons.
Sunday, October 12, 2014
Thursday, October 9, 2014
Ν. Χουντής: «Στόχος μας η διαγραφή του μεγαλύτερου μέρους του χρέους με ρήτρα αποπληρωμής και ανάπτυξης»
Ν. Χουντής: «Στόχος μας η διαγραφή του μεγαλύτερου μέρους του χρέους με ρήτρα αποπληρωμής και ανάπτυξης»
Ο Ν.Χ. είναι υπεύθυνος της επιτροπής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ για τη διαπραγμάτευση του χρέους,
Τρείς άξωνες
1. Να δούμε ποιό πραγματικά το ύψος μετά απο Διεθνή Λογιστικό Έλεγχο.... απαλείφοντας, διαγράφοντας, αποσύροντας το επαχθές μέρος
2. Να δούμε σε ποιό βαθμό φταίει η ΕΕ, που αν και γνώριζε, μας άφησε να φτάσουμε εκεί που φτάσαμε, και να μας ¨αποζημειώσει¨
3. Μετά τα <1> και <2> να δούμε άν και σε ποιό βαθμό αυτό που μένει το αντέχει η οικονομία
Ο Ν.Χ. είναι υπεύθυνος της επιτροπής του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ για τη διαπραγμάτευση του χρέους,
Τρείς άξωνες
1. Να δούμε ποιό πραγματικά το ύψος μετά απο Διεθνή Λογιστικό Έλεγχο.... απαλείφοντας, διαγράφοντας, αποσύροντας το επαχθές μέρος
2. Να δούμε σε ποιό βαθμό φταίει η ΕΕ, που αν και γνώριζε, μας άφησε να φτάσουμε εκεί που φτάσαμε, και να μας ¨αποζημειώσει¨
3. Μετά τα <1> και <2> να δούμε άν και σε ποιό βαθμό αυτό που μένει το αντέχει η οικονομία
Wednesday, October 8, 2014
IMF FISCAL MONITOR October 2014
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2014/02/pdf/fm1402.pdf
left.gr 'Χρηματοδοτικό κενό 27 δισ. ευρώ για το 2015-2016"
Απο τους πίνακες
left.gr 'Χρηματοδοτικό κενό 27 δισ. ευρώ για το 2015-2016"
Απο τους πίνακες
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015 2016
2017
General Government Overall Balance (Percent of GDP)
–6.2 –6.8 –9.9 –15.6 –11.0 –9.6 –6.4
–3.2 –2.7 –1.9 –0.6
–0.7
General
Government Primary Balance (Percent of GDP)
–1.6 –2.0 –4.8 –10.5 –5.1 –2.4 –1.3
0.8 1.5 3.0
4.5 4.5
General
Government Cyclically Adjusted Balance (Percent of potential GDP)
–8.7 –10.8 –14.3 –19.1 –12.3 –8.3 –2.3
1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.4
General
Government Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (Percent of potential GDP)
–3.7 –5.6 –8.6 –13.6 –6.2 –1.3 2.3 5.1 5.4 5.7 6.1 5.5
General
Government Revenue (Percent of GDP)
39.2 40.7 40.7 38.3 40.4 42.2 43.8 44.0 44.6 43.2 42.4 42.2
General
Government Expenditure (Percent of GDP)
45.4 47.5 50.6 54.0 51.4 51.9 50.2 47.2 47.3 45.1 43.0 42.9
General
Government Gross Debt (Percent of GDP)
107.5 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 157.2 175.1 174.2 171.0 160.5 152.0
General
Government Net Debt (Percent of GDP)
107.5 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 153.5 169.7 168.8 166.6 157.6 149.6
Tuesday, October 7, 2014
"Monday, October 6, 2014
Saturday, October 4, 2014
Friday, October 3, 2014
Carsten Brzeski : Eurozone - Heading towards Animal Farm?
Merkelnomics: Eurozone - Heading towards Animal Farm?
The Eurozone is preparing for yet another showdown on the right balance between austerity and growth. Italy, but even more so France, laid down the gauntlet to EU partners in recent days, presenting fiscal plans which would clearly be in strong contrast with the Eurozone’s fiscal framework.
Wednesday, October 1, 2014
Germany Fights on Two Fronts to Preserve the Eurozone | Stratfor
Germany Fights on Two Fronts to Preserve the Eurozone | Stratfor
This puts Germany in a dilemma because two of its key imperatives are in contradiction. Will it save the eurozone to protect its exports, writing a big check as part of the deal? Or will it oppose the ECB moves, which if blocked could mean a return to dangerously high bond yields and the return of rumors of Greece, Italy and others leaving the currency union?
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